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Public health can be achieved onlythrough collective action. Individ-uals acting alone cannot protect
themselves from work hazards, unsafe or
ineffective vaccines and pharmaceuti-
cals, impure food and water, a polluted
environment, or epidemics. Only a well-
regulated society can secure the essential
conditions for health. Yet in this coun-
try, successive administrations have
eroded health and safety protections.
The consequences include deaths in the
mining industry, lead in toys, industrial
solvents in toothpaste, harmful bacteria
in peanut butter and spinach, and un-
safe and ineffective pharmaceuticals
(such as COX-2 inhibitors and non-
statin cholesterol medications).
The “Deregulatory State” is a result
of a conservative campaign that has cre-
ated and reinforced deep-seated con-
cerns about overbearing government.
The political dialogue used to describe
agency action is pejorative and effective:
“big government,” “centralized,” “top-
down,” and “bureaucratic.” This anti-
government narrative has set the terms
of the debate about the role of govern-
ment in protecting the public from mar-
ket excesses and failures.
The Deregulatory State takes many
subtle forms, including self-policing, so
that industry discloses and corrects its
own safety violations; incapacitating, so
that agencies are starved of expertise and
resources; devolving, so that residual reg-
ulation is focused at the local level; pre-
empting, so that the federal government
denies states the authority to protect
their citizens; and privatizing, so that
government functions are conducted by
“for-profit” or voluntary entities. In this
column, I will focus on two broad cate-
gories of deregulation: federal preemp-
tion and privatization.
Regulatory Vacuums through
Preemption
Congress has the power to preempt,or supersede, public health regula-
tion at the state level, even if the state is
acting squarely within its police powers.
Federal preemption may seem like an ar-
cane doctrine, but it has powerful conse-
quences for the public’s health and safe-
ty. The Supreme Court’s preemption de-
cisions can effectively foreclose mean-
ingful state regulation and prevent peo-
ple from turning to the courts for legal
redress.1 Preemption has had antiregula-
tory effects on issues ranging from to-
bacco control to occupational health
and safety, motor vehicle safety, and em-
ployer health care plans. From 2001 to
2006, Congress enacted twenty-seven
statutes that preempt state health, safety,
and environmental policies, demonstrat-
ing the potential breadth of federal
power to override state public health
safeguards.2
The Bush administration has vigor-
ously advocated preemption to invali-
date state public health efforts in both
amicus curiae briefs and preambles to
agency rules. On February 20, 2008, the
Roberts Court handed the administra-
tion a victory in two major preemption
cases. In Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor
Transport Association, the Court held
that a federal transportation statute pre-
empted Maine’s laws designed to pre-
vent minors from buying cigarettes on
the Internet.3 In Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.,
the Court ruled that manufacturers are
immune from tort liability for medical
devices, such as implantable defibrilla-
tors or heart pumps, that received pre-
market approval and meet Food and
Drug Administration specifications.4
The Court just heard another FDA pre-
emption case on whether tort liability
can be based on fraud for misrepresent-
ing or withholding information from
the agency during the approval process.
And next term, the Court will decide
whether FDA drug approval preempts
personal injury suits. In effect, the exec-
utive and judicial branches are disman-
tling a long-standing civil justice safety
net for consumers and patients who suf-
fer from industry misconduct left
unchecked by federal and state regula-
tions.
Outside the courtroom, multiple
agencies charged with protecting public
health, safety, and the environment have
systematically pushed for preemption
through administrative rulemaking.
Federal agencies have inserted preemp-
tory language in preambles to rules gov-
erning everything from seatbelt place-
ment (this from the National Highway
Traffic and Safety Administration) and
mattress flammability (the Consumer
Product Safety Commission) to drug la-
beling (the FDA) and railroad safety
(the Railroad Administration). This
troubling trend is made all the more
worrisome by the administration’s fail-
ure to provide an opportunity for public
comment on the preemption language
in rule preambles.
This sweeping preemption of state
regulation and tort actions has created
regulatory vacuums. Instead of advocat-
ing devolution or otherwise supporting
state authority to protect the public’s
health, the federal government has con-
sistently derailed state regulation. At the
same time, it has dismantled federal
safety standards, leaving a large regulato-
ry abyss. For example, even after the
Supreme Court ruled that the Environ-
mental Protection Agency had the
power to regulate heat-trapping gases
emitted by automobiles, the agency not
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only refused to regulate but also pre-
vented California from filling the regu-
latory gap.5
Thus, the public remains unprotect-
ed prospectively because the federal gov-
ernment both declines to regulate and
suppresses state efforts to do so. And the
public is unprotected retrospectively be-
cause of the Court’s invalidation of state
tort law. In short, the public is left to
fend for itself.
Trusting the Private Sector
Privatization, understood broadly, isthe government’s abdication of re-
sponsibility for health governance by as-
signing public functions to the private
sector. It can happen directly, when the
state contracts out governmental func-
tions to industry (such as in mental
health care, prisons, or child welfare ser-
vices). Or it can happen indirectly, when
the state withdraws financial and politi-
cal support for critical agency functions,
cooperates with industry in setting and
enforcing standards, or simply allows
companies to self-regulate.
Agency incapacity. Government can
avoid stringent regulation simply by
starving agencies of funds or making
them rely on industry largess for re-
sources. The FDA offers a classic case
study of how the White House and
Congress can weaken a once powerful
agency. The FDA is responsible for the
safety of approximately 80 percent of
food sold and all human drugs, vaccines,
and medical devices. All told, it regulates
25 percent of all consumer spending—
about $1 trillion per year. Yet Congress
has steadily either reduced funding or
held it constant, even as the FDA’s func-
tions have expanded vastly, and public
concern for food, drug, and medical de-
vices has increased. The FDA’s resource
shortfalls have resulted in inadequate in-
spections, a dearth of scientists, inability
to speed the development of new thera-
pies, and neglect of food and drug im-
ports. For example, the FDA now car-
ries out 78 percent fewer food inspec-
tions than thirty-five years ago and in-
spects food manufacturers on average
only once every ten years. The agency
needs twice its current level of funding
to be properly equipped to fulfill its mis-
sion.6 The FDA is also hampered by the
lack of clear regulatory authority, orga-
nizational problems, and a scarcity of
postapproval data about drugs’ risks and
benefits.7 Just as troubling, the FDA’s
major source of funding for drug ap-
provals is user fees from pharmaceutical
companies, which invites criticism
about the agency’s close relationship
with industry.
Self-policing. As part of the trend
against state regulation, agencies have
developed self-policing programs that
shift the burden of regulatory compli-
ance from government to industry. The
Occupational Safety and Health Ad-
ministration’s “Voluntary Protection
Program” exempts participating firms
from routine inspection and eschews
formal adjudication. With the virtual
nonenforcement of violations under this
program, industry’s abysmal record of
safety compliance is not surprising.
OSHA has repeatedly failed to prosecute
firms with a long history of safety viola-
tions, even in the face of debilitating in-
juries and deaths caused by employer
negligence.8 Similarly, the Department
of Veterans Affairs’ “Medical Errors”
program asks hospitals to self-disclose
dangerous forms of malpractice, and the
EPA’s “Greenlights” recognizes and re-
wards firms for self-disclosing and cor-
recting safety violations. But industry
has only mild incentives to self-police,
and researchers say they do so only if
agencies increase inspections and com-
pliance.9
Self-regulation. In an increasingly
deregulated state, industry representa-
tives, rather than government, have ini-
tiated much contemporary “regulatory”
activity. Forms of industry self-regula-
tion include codes of conduct, collabo-
rative agreements, accreditation, infor-
mation disclosure, and ratings. These
programs govern a wide array of do-
mains, including worker and product
safety, consumer protection, environ-
mental management, fire prevention,
and advertising (such as for tobacco and
alcoholic beverages). Perhaps the most
prominent recent illustration of self-reg-
ulation is the decision by food and bev-
erage manufacturers to limit sales in
schools and curb advertising to children.
But more often than not, self-regulation
occurs in response to pressure by gov-
ernment or advocacy groups. For exam-
ple, the food and beverage industries an-
nounced their schools and advertising
policies shortly after the publication of
Federal Trade Commission reports high-
lighting their deceptive practices and the
risks of obesity.
Because they are not in a position to
defend themselves and their families,
members of society need the protection
of the state. If the government drastical-
ly reduces regulation and enforcement
and leaves core government duties to the
private sector, current and future gener-
ations will suffer. Indeed, it was in
recognition of the palpable harms of the
free market that health, safety, and envi-
ronmental regimes and civil justice sys-
tems emerged. They have evolved over a
long period to work synergistically in
their protective effect; the whole system
is now under serious threat.
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